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BETWEEN SKYLLA AND CHARYBDIS: THE
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT RUSHES TOWARD
DISASTER IN TUCKER v. KEMP*
"So we sailed up the narrow strait lamenting. On the one side was
Skylla, and on the other side was shining Charybdis, who made
her terrible ebb and flow of the sea's water."
Homer, The Odyssey, XII, 234236 (trans. Richard Lattimore)
MARSHALL DAYAN**

In January 1983, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit decided the case of Hance v. Zant.t Establishing a stringent
standard apparently in line with the Supreme Court's requirement of
heightened reliability in capital cases, the Eleventh Circuit reversed
Hance's death sentence. The court held, inter alia, that the prosecutor's
inflammatory closing argument at the end of the sentencing phase of the
trial was violative of the eighth and fourteenth amendments.
Six months later, in a group of four other death penalty cases, the
United States Supreme Court dismissed challenges to the sentencing process. 2 The Court held that as long as the information presented to the
sentencing authority was reliable, and related to the defendant's crime or
character, the constitutional protections of the eighth and fourteenth
amendments were not violated.
These cases, coupled with Strickland v. Washington,3 a Supreme
Court decision regarding ineffective assistance of counsel, led the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals to overrule its decision in Hance less than
three years later. In Brooks v. Kemp 4 and its companion case, William
Tucker v. Kemp,5 the Eleventh Circuit applied a radically new standard
for reversal of death sentences based on prosecutorial misconduct at clos* Just prior to the publication of this Comment, the Eleventh Circuit decided Tucker, on
remand from the U.S. Supreme Court. In a per curiam opinion, the Court concluded that the
"reasonable probability" prejudice test was consistent with Caldwell v. Mississippi, particularly in
light of the Supreme Court's decision in Darden. Tucker v. Kemp, slip op. No. 83-8137 (Sept. 29,
1986). Since the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the analysis of its prior opinion, the conclusions here
remain the same.
** J.D. 1986, Antioch School of Law; B.A. 1984, University of Georgia. The author wishes to
thank Susanne Blume for her helpful comments.
1 696 F.2d 940 (11th Cir. 1983).
2 Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983); Barclay v.
Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983); California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983).
3 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
4 762 F.2d 1383 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
5 762 F.2d 1480, reh'g denied, 762 F.2d 1496, (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
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ing argument. On petition for writ of certiorari to the Eleventh Circuit,
however, the United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Tucker.6 The Supreme Court remanded the cause for further consideration in light of Caldwell v. MissisSippi,7 a recently decided death penalty case also involving prosecutorial
misconduct at closing argument.
This Comment analyzes the tragic series of misperceptions by the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, places much of the blame for the
Eleventh Circuit's improper application of a legal principle on the shoulders of the United States Supreme Court, and proposes an appropriate
standard of review for challenges to death sentences based on
prosecutorial misconduct at closing argument.
The Supreme Court has failed to develop a consistent eighth amendment jurisprudence regarding capital punishment in America. While announcing a "heightened need for reliability" in death penalty cases in
1976, the Court has decided against guaranteeing this reliability by developing a strict procedural formula for the death penalty's imposition.
Rather, the Court has hoped that allowing both sides great freedom in
presenting evidence on the appropriate sentence would correct the earlier
propensity of the criminal justice system to apply the death penalty in a
random, capricious and arbitrary manner. Unfortunately, that has not
occurred.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has steered an uneven course, tacking
wide across the legal seas from one side to the other, and back again.
While attorneys, court-watchers, and death penalty opponents have long
been frustrated by the Court's meanderings, the most apparent victims of
the Supreme Court's erratic decisions, other than the inmates themselves,
have been the lower federal courts, whose responsibility it is to apply this
body of law.
Part I of this Comment sketches the modern development of constitutional jurisprudence regarding the imposition of the death penalty.
Part II examines the Supreme Court's decisions regarding prosecutorial
misconduct at closing argument. Part III discusses the current confusion
in the Eleventh Circuit regarding the confluence of death penalty jurisprudence and prosecutorial misconduct of constitutional dimension, and
assesses blame for the confusion. Part IV proposes a modified return to
the standard of Hance v. Zant 8 for assessing alleged prosecutorial misconduct at closing argument, as well as a standard for reversal in death
penalty- cases when those errors rise to constitutional dimension. The
U.S. -,

88 L.Ed.2d 452 (1985).
105 S.Ct. 2633 (1985).
8 696 F.2d 940 (1 1th Cir. 1983).

6 -

7 472 U.S. -,
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Comment concludes that these proposed standards protect those facing
the possibility of the irrevocable punishment of death, and also serve to
reinforce the role of the prosecutor, not merely as an advocate, but as a
guarantor that justice is done.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF DEATH PENALTY LAW, 1972-1986*

With Furman v. Georgia,9 the United States Supreme Court in 1972
considered for the first time a direct assault on capital punishment as
violative of the eighth amendment's "cruel and unusual punishments"
clause and the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. In nine separate opinions, the Justices expounded their individual views on the legality and propriety of capital punishment. Two Justices, Brennan' and
Marshall, "tconsidered the death penalty unconstitutional per se. Justice
Douglas concluded that the untrammeled discretion of judges and juries
to impose the death penalty violated the idea of equal protection implicit
in the eighth amendment.' 2 Justice Stewart focused on the arbitrariness
of capital sentencing given the sentencers' absolute discretion. He noted
that "if any basis can be discerned for the selection of those few selected
to die, it is the constitutionally impermissible basis of race.' 3 Concluding that the death penalty was being applied so infrequently that it ceased
to have any significant penological justification, Justice White also concurred. The death penalty was reduced, he wrote, to "the pointless and
needless extinction of life," and hence violative of the eighth amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment.' 4 Furman invalidated the
death sentences of all 629 persons on death row at that time,' 5 culminatt6
ing a legal struggle that began in earnest in the early 1960s.
After Furman was decided, a majority of states reenacted death penalty statutes which purported to correct the problem of arbitrariness in
one of two ways: mandatory death penalty statutes or guided discretion
statutes. The mandatory statutes required that everyone convicted of
capital murder be sentenced to death. Most of the "guided discretion"
* The discussion of the development of death penalty law contained herein is necessarily brief.
More detailed accounts are numerous; see, e.g., Greenburg, Capital Punishmentas a System, 91 Yale
L.J. 908 (1982); Weisburg, Deregulating Death, 1983 Sup. Ct. Rev. 305; Special Project, Capital
Punishment in 1984: Abandoning the Pursuitof Fairness and Consistency, 69 Cornell L. Rev. 1129
(1984).
9 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
10 Id., at 257 (Brennan, J. concurring).
IIId., at 314 (Marshall, J. concurring).
12 Id., at 240 (Douglas, J.concurring).
13Id., at 306, 310 (Stewart, J. concurring) (footnote omitted).
14Id., at 310, 312 (White, J. concurring).
15 Greenburg, supra, at 915.
16 M. Meltsner, Cruel and Unusual: The Supreme Court and CapitalPunishment, 75 (1973).
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statutes were variations of the Model Penal Code's death penalty statute. 17 They included features such as bifurcated trials with separate sentencing hearings, a list of aggravating and mitigating factors for the
sentencer to consider, and automatic appellate review. States which relied on juries to recommend or impose the appropriate sentence at the
sentencing phase of these trials uniformly selected one jury to perform
both tasks.
Both types of statutes were reviewed by the United States Supreme
Court in 1976 in Gregg v. Georgia and four companion cases. 18 The
Court held the mandatory statutes to be violations of the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. In Woodson v.
North Carolina,19 the Court reasoned that society has, through its legislatures and juries, rejected mandatory death sentences. 20 Also important
was that mandatory death statutes did not eliminate unbridled jury discretion but reconstituted it in the guise of jury nullification. The plurality concluded that "in capital cases the fundamental respect for
humanity underlying the eighth amendment requires consideration of the
character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of
the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death."' 2 1 Further, the Court concluded
that the qualitative difference between the punishment of death and any
other criminal sanction required a "corresponding difference in the need
for reliability that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific
case." '22 This has become known as the "heightened reliability" or
"death is different" doctrine.
While this doctrine has never been strictly defined, it has been used
to overturn death sentences when "the circumstances under which they
were imposed 'created an unacceptable risk that the death penalty may
have been meted out arbitrarily or capriciously or through whim ...

or

mistake.' "123 Another formulation of the doctrine of "heightened reliability" requires that sentences of death "be, and appear to be, based on
'24
reason rather than caprice or emotion."

In addressing the guided discretion statutes, the Court gave its bless17

Model Penal Code, § 201.6 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).

18 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Profitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas,

428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428
U.S. 325 (1976).
19 428 U.S. at 288-301.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 304.
22 Id. at 305.
23 Caldwell v. Mississippi, supra, 105 S. Ct. 2633, 2647 (1985) (O'Connor, J. concurring) citing
California v. Ramos, at 999; 103 S. Ct. at 3451.
24 Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977).
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ing to those before it, holding, in Gregg that the death penalty was not
per se unconstitutional. 25 Taken as a whole, Gregg and its companion
cases taught the states several lessons regarding how the death penalty
might constitutionally be imposed.
First, the states learned that as long as they include a separate sentencing hearing where the sentencer is apprised of "the factors that the
State, representing organized society, deems particularly relevant to the
sentencing decision,"' 26 the particular form their statutes took would be
specifically prescribed. 27 The states also learned that those factors
should narrow the class of murderers for whom death might be the appropriate punishment. 21 In addition, the statutes must direct the sentencer's attention to an individualized consideration of the crime and
29
character of the defendant.
In the years following Gregg, the Supreme Court refined the eighth
amendment principles by which states could constitutionally impose
sentences of death. Of the seventeen death penalty cases decided by the
United States Supreme Court between the October, 1976 term and the
October, 1981 term, fifteen death sentences were reversed. In large part,
those cases were concerned with the scope of information adduced at the
sentencing phase of the bifurcated death penalty trial. The Court constitutionally expanded the scope of information that could be considered by
the sentencer. They eliminated traditional evidentiary bars such as hearsay, and granted the defense unusually broad rights to review and rebut
anything submitted by the prosecution tending to support the sentence of
death.
The clear inference of these reversals drawn by the lower federal
30
courts was that the oft-repeated principle of "heightened reliability"
should be broadly construed to protect against the improper imposition
of the ultimate and irrevocable punishment of death. It is likewise clear
that the lower federal courts acted in conformity with this
understanding.

31

In 1983, however, the United States Supreme Court seemed to ex25 428 U.S. 153, 169.
26 Id., at 192.
27 Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 269-270.
28 Id.
29 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304. ("A process that accords no significance to
relevant facets of the character and record of the individual offender or the circumstances of the
particular offense excludes from consideration in fixing the ultimate punishment of death the possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind.").
30 See, e.g., Gardner, 430 U.S. 349, 357-358, accord; Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978);
Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637-638 (1980); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 118 (1982)

(O'Connor, J. concurring).
31 Greenburg, supra at 918.
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press doubts about the high degree of scrutiny state death sentences were
being subjected to by the federal courts when applying "heightened
reliability. "32
The Eleventh Circuit had reversed the death sentence in Zant v. Stephens.33 The alleged error stemmed from the fact that the Georgia
Supreme Court, in another case subsequent to Stephens' death sentence,
invalidated on vagueness grounds one of the two aggravating factors
found by the jury to support his death sentence. 34 Despite the affirmance
of Stephens' death sentence by the Georgia Supreme Court (and its conclusion that the subsequent invalidation of one of the aggravating circumstances did not affect the proprierty of Stephens' death sentence), the
Court of Appeals held that the death penalty was invalid. The court
concluded that "it cannot be determined with the degree of certainty required in capital cases that the instruction [regarding the invalid aggravating circumstances] did not make a critical difference in the jury's
35
decision to impose the death sentence." (Emphasis added.)
The Supreme Court certified a question to the Georgia Supreme
Court regarding the state law premises supporting the conclusion that
the death sentence was unaffected by the invalidity of one of the statutory
aggravating circumstances found by the jury. 36 The Court then reversed
the Eleventh Circuit and reinstated Stephens' sentence of death. Focusing on the information provided the jury surrounding the invalid circumstances, the Court reasoned that even though the statutory aggravating
circumstances applicable in a given case direct the jury's attention to an
individualized consideration of the appropriate punishment, "the Constitution does not require the jury to ignore other possible aggravating factors in the process of selecting ...

those defendants who will actually be

sentenced to death."'3 7 Since the information supporting the invalid aggravating circumstances was not incorrect or misleading, and was properly before the jury, the constitutionality of Stephens' death sentence was
not affected.
The difference in the two approaches is clear. The Eleventh Circuit
was concerned that the labelling of the evidence before the jury as an
"aggravating circumstance" might have tended to impel the jury's conclusion that death was the appropriate punishment in this case. The
Supreme Court, however, concluded that the information's "label" was
unimportant. As long as the evidence provided by the prosecution was
Stephens, 462 U.S. 862.
33 631 F.2d 397 (1980), modified, 648 F.2d 446 (1981).
32

34 Arnold v. State, 236 Ga. 534, 539-542, 224 S.E.2d 386, 391-392 (1976).
35 Stephens, 631 F.2d at 406.
36

Zant v. Stephens, 456 U.S. 410 (1982).

37 Stephens v. Zant, 462 U.S. at 878.
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not otherwise improper, its presentation as an "aggravating circumstance" did not render the procedure by which Stephens was sentenced
to death unconstitutional.
"Heightened reliability," as it had come to be understood, was no
longer of primacy to the Supreme Court in death penalty cases. If Stephens did not make this clear, three death penalty cases handed down by
the Court two weeks later either affirming or reinstating death sentences
removed all doubt. 38 Nevertheless, the Court has continued to invoke
"heightened reliability," and "death is different" remains at least a means
to raise colorable claims of constitutional error in state and federal
courts, and is occasionally employed by the Court to reverse death
sentences and expand the principles of eighth amendment jurisprudence
regarding the death penalty.
Another case important in understanding the Eleventh Circuit's
change of heart in interpreting the mixed signals of the Supreme Court in
Strickland v. Washington.39 In this case, the Supreme Court set a standard of review for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel raised in
petitions for writs of habeas corpus.
Since most states apply strict waiver rules which preclude assigning
errors on appeal when there was no contemporaneous objection at trial,
the only way to raise serious constitutional issues is to allege ineffective
assistance of counsel. Because of the highly specialized nature of death
penalty litigation, and because of the consequences of trial attorneys' failings are so significant, ineffective assistance of counsel has become a
fairly familiar post-conviction claim in death penalty cases. Realizing
the difficulty of judging attorney performance from an historical vantage
point without using hindsight, the Supreme Court established a stringent
two part test for proving a sixth amendment violation of the right to
effective assistance of counsel. The Court held that in order for relief to
be granted on such a claim, the defendant/petitioner must show that the
assistance received was not reasonably effective (based primarily on
whether actions taken by counsel were "strategic," premised on reasonable research of facts and law). 4° The defendant must show that counsel's errors resulted in a reasonable probability that the outcome of the
guilt phase, the sentencing phase of the trial, or both, would have been
different. 4 1 This standard for prejudice of "reasonable probability that
the result would have been different" was a radical departure from the
usual standard for determining prejudice resulting from error of constitu38 Barefoot, 463 U.S. 880; Barclay, 463 U.S. 939; Ramas, 463 U.S. 992.
39 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
40 Id. at 691.
41 Id. at 694.
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tional dimension. In Section III, I will analyze the reasoning behind this
departure and assess the applicability of this standard to prosecutorial
misconduct at closing argument in death penalty cases.
While not squarely addressing the problem of alleged prosecutorial
misconduct at closing argument in the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial, the Court has decided two death penalty cases involving
prosecutorial misconduct at closing argument in the last two years.
Near the close of the October, 1984 term, the Supreme Court decided Caldwell v. Mississippi.42 The Court held that a prosecutor's clos-

ing argument in the penalty phase suggesting that the jury's actions
would automatically be reviewed by the state supreme court rendered the
death sentence unconstitutional. Section II below will review the Court's
reasoning and will consider the implications of Caldwell for other
prosecutorial misconduct at closing argument cases.
In the spring of 1986, the Supreme Court decided Darden v. Wainwright,4 3 another death penalty case involving prosecutorial misconduct
at closing argument. The alleged error in Darden came at the conclusion
of the guilt phase as opposed to the penalty phase of the capital murder
trial. The Court, therefore, did not apply "heightened reliability" to the
alleged error in Darden; rather, the Court ajudged the claim in light of
fourteenth amendment fundamental fairness and held that, while improper, the argument assigned as error did not so infect the trial as to
deny the petitioners due process. Section II will critically analyze the
opinions of the Darden decision, and discuss the implications of the
Court's decision for other death penalty cases involving prosecutorial
misconduct at closing argument.
II.

THE SUPREME COURT AND PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT AT
CLOSING ARGUMENT

The United States Supreme Court has rarely taken the opportunity
to address prosecutorial misconduct at closing argument, and even more
rarely has the Court addressed such error rising to constitutional dimension. The major reason for this is the difficulty of raising a successful
claim. The conduct of the trial is generally considered to be in the wise
discretion of the trial court, and only those errors which are so egregious
as to deny the defendant a fundamentally fair trial will be considered
reversible error.
In Berger v. United States,44 the Supreme Court considered a host of
42

472 U.S. -,

105 S. Ct. 2633 (1985).

43 54 U.S.L.W. 4734 (June 23, 1986).

- 235 U.S. 78 (1935).

1986]

TUCKER v. KEMP

prosecutorial improprieties, including improper argument. Berger was
charged with conspiracy to transfer counterfeit notes. Berger was convicted, and his conviction was affirmed by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit. On petition for writ of certiorari, Berger
raised as error the conduct of the prosecutor, alleging not only improper
closing argument but also misstating facts in cross-examination, misspeaking the testimony of witnesses, insinuating that he had knowledge
of facts not adduced at trial, and arguing with and harassing witnesses. 45
Regarding the alleged improprieties at closing argument, Berger complained that the prosecutor suggested facts not in evidence, and that he
46
attacked the defense for unfair tactics.
On these claims, the United States Supreme Court reversed the conviction. Justice Sutherland, writing for the majority, eloquently discussed the responsibility of the prosecutor to represent the state and, in
so doing, "refrain from improper methods. '4 7 The twofold aim of the
prosecutor is to ensure "that guilt shall not escape nor innocence
48
suffer."
On the more practical problem of the alleged errors in the case, the
Court noted that juries expect prosecutors to be fair and honest. "Consequently, improper suggestions, insinuations, and especially, assertions of
personal knowledge are apt to carry much weight against the accused
when they should properly carry none."' 49 The Court also considered the
extent of the prosecutor's improprieties, concluding, "we have not here a
case where the misconduct of the prosecuting attorney was slight or confined in a single instance, but one where such misconduct was pronounced and persistent, with a probable cumulative effect upon the jury
' 50
which cannot be regarded as inconsequential.
Having established a standard for characterizing prosecutorial
overzealousness as error which could warrant reversal, the Court next
approached the task of establishing a standard for prejudice. The Court
noted that the case against the accused was weak, not strong, and suggested that in another case in which the evidence is overwhelming, the
result might be different. Nevertheless, under the circumstances the
Court reversed, because "prejudice to the accused is so highly probable
that we are not justified in assuming its non-existence." 5' While taking
45 Id. at 84.
46

47

Id.
Id. at 88.

48 Id.
49

Id.

50 Id. at 89.
51

Id.
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into consideration the strength of the government's case, the key to the
Court's prejudice standard was the likelihood of its effect on the jury.
While Berger sets the tone for an evaluation of overzealous
prosecutorial misconduct, it is only of limited value as persuasive authority in challenges to prosecutorial misconduct in state proceedings. Berger involved a federal prosecution and was decided under federal
criminal law, through the exercise of the Court's supervisory power over
the lower federal courts. Alleged prosecutorial misconduct in state criminal proceedings must rise to errors of constitutional dimension in order
to be considered on appeal or certiorari by the United States Supreme
Court, or in post-conviction proceedings in the lower federal courts. The
error must be so egregious as to deny the defendant that fairness "so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be as
fundamental."

'5 2

This was precisely the claim made by Benjamin DeChristoforo following his conviction of first degree murder in Massachusetts Superior
Court. The United States District Court denied relief, but the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed, holding that the
prosecutor's remarks deliberately conveyed the false impression that the
defendant had unsuccessfully sought to plead guilty to a lesser charge
and that this conduct was a denial of due process.5 3 The United States
Supreme Court granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari.
The allegations of prosecutorial misconduct at closing argument in
this case involved the prosecutor telling the jury that he "honestly and
sincerely believe[d] that there is no doubt [of guilt] in this case, none
whatsoever." '5 4 The second remark which allegedly violated the defendant's due process rights concerned the prosecutor's beliefs as to the defendant's motivations for going to trial. "They [the defendant and his
counsel] said they hope you find him not guilty. I quite frankly think
that they hope you find him guilty of something a little less than first
degree murder.

'55

The defense immediately objected to this argument and later sought
and received a curative instruction from the trial court. Nevertheless,
the defense assigned this improper argument as error on appeal and in
post-conviction proceedings.
The United States Supreme Court began its decision by noting that,
in a narrow due process analysis, "not every trial error or infirmity which
might call for application of supervisory power constitutes [a due process
52

Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).

53 Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 639 (1974).
54

Id. at 640, n.6.

55 Id.
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violation]." ' 56 The Court tried to minimize the severity of the error by

distinguishing it from specific violations of provisions of the Bill of
Rights,5 7 and by suggesting alternative interpretations not constituting
error, characterizing the remark, therefore, as ambiguous. The Court
also noted that the curative instruction given by the trial court mitigated
the effect of the argument. Finally, the Court viewed the remarks as only
"one moment in an extended trial," and denied that it so infected the
proceedings as to deny due process. 58 Arguing but not conceding the
argument to be error, the Court held that such an incident does not rise
59
to error of constitutional dimension.
Eleven years later, the Supreme Court held that prosecutorial misconduct at closing argument in death penalty cases which is inaccurate
and misleading in a manner that diminishes the sentencer's sense of responsibility violates not only the fourteenth amendment's due process
clause, but also the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishments. In Caldwell v. Mississippi,6° the defendant was
charged with the capital murder of a rural grocer during the course of a
robbery. After conviction, the state proceeded to a sentencing hearing at
which it sought the death penalty. During closing argument, the defense
lawyer tried to emphasize the jurors' responsibility for the defendant's
fate, telling them, "[y]ou can give him life or you can give him death. It's
going to be your decision."' 6' In response, the prosecutor told the jury he
thought the defense tactics unfair. "Now, they would have you believe
that you're going to kill this man and they know-they know that your
decision is not the final decision. My God, how unfair can you be? Your
job is reviewable. ' '6 2 The defense attorney immediately objected, but the
trial judge ruled that the prosecutor should make a full disclosure in order to ameliorate the jury's confusion. The prosecutor then took the opportunity to again tell the jury that the defense had been unfair,
56 Id. at 642.
57 Id. at 643 ("When specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights are involved, this Court has taken
special care to assure that prosecutorial conduct in no way impermissibly infringes them. But here
the claim is only that a prosecutor's remark about respondent's expectations at trial by itself so
infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.")
58 Id. at 645.
59 Justice Rehnquist's reasoning in this case is, in places, somewhat specious. It seems disingenuous to draw a distinction between errors alleged to be explicit violations of provisions of the Bill of
Rights and other due process violations. For example, while not specifically listed in the Bill of
Rights, the presumption of the accused's innocence and the burden of the State to prove guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt have been as scrupulously guarded by the courts as fifth and sixth amendment
protections. This point need not, however, be argued in death penalty cases, for the eighth amendment procedural safeguards are explicit Bill of Rights protections.
- 472 U.S. -, 105 S. Ct. 2633 (1985).
61 Id. at 2637.
62 Id.
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...insinuating that your decision is the final decision and that
they're gonna take Bobby Caldwell out in front of this Courthouse
in moments and string him up and that is terribly, terribly unfair.
For they know, as I know, and as Judge Baker has told you, that
the decision you render is automatically reviewable by the
Supreme Court. Automatically, and I think its unfair and I don't
63
mind telling them so.
On appeal to the Mississippi Supreme Court, the defense raised as
error the prosecutor's comments to the jury. After affirming the conviction, an equally divided court affirmed the death sentence. 64
The United States Supreme Court squarely addressed the petitioner's claim of prosecutorial misconduct at closing argument. The
Court began by noting that the eighth amendment's requirement for
heightened reliability in death penalty cases applies to the sentencer's
guided discretion, and that the sentencers must treat their "awesome responsibility" with the appropriate seriousness. State induced suggestions
that the sentencing jury may shift its sense of responsibility to an appellate court legitimately create fears of "substantial unreliability as well as
bias in favor of death sentences."' 65 The Court explained that appellate
courts are naturally very limited in their abilities to review the sentencing
decisions in capital cases, particularly when juries are involved, noting
that appellate courts are not able to glean from transcripts those "in'66
tangibles a jury might consider in its sentencing determination.
Hence, "most appellate courts review sentencing determinations with a
'67
presumption of correctness."
The Court further posited that a jury might be more willing to err in
favor of the more severe punishment if it knows that its decision was
reviewable and "correctable" on appeal. Some jurors might also think,
correctly, that a life sentence could not be increased on appeal, while the
inverse would not be true. Hence, the Court reasoned, a jury seeking to
"delegate" its sentencing responsibility could do so only by returning a
sentence of death. A sentence based on such factors will "simply not
represent a decision that the state had demonstrated the appropriateness
of the defendant's death. ' 68 Since the jury is given very little guidance as
to how to exercise its discretion within legal parameters, "the uncorrected suggestion that the responsibility for any ultimate determination
of death will rest with others presents an intolerable danger that the jury
63
64
65
66

Id. at 2638.
443 So. 2d 806 (Miss. 1983).
Caldwell, 105 S. Ct. at 2640.
Id.
67 Id. at 2641.
68 Id.
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will in fact choose to minimize the importance of its role."' 69 Therefore
the Court concluded, "the chance that an invitation to rely on that review will generate a bias toward returning a death sentence is simply too
' 70
great."
The State of Mississippi attempted to counter any suggestion that
the argument was constitutionally impermissible by arguing that reversal
on such grounds would be precluded by Donnelly v. DeChristoforo.71 The
Court rejected this view, distinguishing Donnelly on several grounds.
First, the Court noted that in Donnelly, the trial court gave a curative
instruction following a defense request for such. In Caldwell, on the
other hand, the trial court not only did not give a curative instruction, it
failed to acknowledge the argument as error and allowed the prosecutor
to repeat the remarks in order to correct any confusion on the part of the
jury. The Supreme Court also distinguished Donnelly on the ground that
the remarks there were arguably "ambiguous" and the error did not implicate an explicit provision of the Bill of Rights, while in Caldwell the
prosecutor's remarks were "quite focused, unambiguous, and strong,"
and implicated the eighth amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishments. In short, "the prosecutor's argument sought to give
the jury a view of its role in the capital sentencing procedure that was
fundamentally incompatible with the eighth amendment's heightened
'need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate
punishment in a specific case.' "72 The Court reversed Caldwell's sentence of death and remanded the cause for the imposition of a life sentence or a new sentencing proceeding.
In the spring of 1986, the United States Supreme Court decided another death penalty case from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
Darden v. Wainwright.73 Darden raised, inter alia, prosecutorial misconduct at closing argument. The challenged argument in Darden's trial
came at the conclusion of the guilty phase, not the sentencing phase of
the capital murder trial. Because the defense offered no testimony, the
prosecutor's summation was both preceded and followed by defense ar74
gument, pursuant to Florida rules.
The Supreme Court, like the Eleventh Circuit before it, adjudged
the arguably improper prosecutorial summation in light of both the
state's claim that any error was invited, and that the defense had an opportunity to mitigate the adverse effect in its final summation. The Court
69

Id. at 2642.

70

Id.

71 Id. at 2644.
72

Caldwell, 105 S. Ct. 2640, 2645, citing Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305.

73 54 U.S.L.W. 4734 (June 23, 1986).
74 Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 3.250 (1973).
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reiterated that the argument was highly improper, noting that every
court that had reviewed the argument also found it to be improper. The
content of the argument was indeed horrific. The prosecutor presented
the jury with his personal opinions, saying, "I am convinced, as convinced as I know I am standing before you today, that Willie Jasper
Darden is a murderer, that he murdered Mr. Turman, that he robbed
Mrs. Turman and that he shot to kill Phillip Arnold. I will be convinced
of that the rest of my life."' 75 The prosecutor also referred to Darden as
an "animal." Another prosecutor who argued a portion of the summation told the jury that Darden "shouldn't be out of his cell unless he has
a leash on him

. .

. " and repeatedly expressed to the jury his wish that

Darden were already dead. 76 Despite the viciousness of these remarks,
however, the Supreme Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals and concluded that these arguments did not render Darden's trial
fundamentally unfair.
The Court began its legal analysis with the familiar recitation from
Donnelly that the "appropriate standard of review for such a claim on
writ of habeas corpus is 'the narrow one of due process, and not the
broad exercise of supervisory power.' ,,77 The Court noted that the prosecutors did not misstate or manipulate evidence, nor did they deny to
Darden any of the specific provisions of the Bill of Rights. Further, it
treated much of the prosecutors' arguments as invited response. In addition, the Court suggested that the instructions from the trial judge that
argument is not evidence, and that the jury's decision was to be based on
evidence alone, "reduced the likelihood that the jury's decision was influenced by the argument. ' 78 The Court also suggested that the weight of
the evidence against the defendant and the use to which the defense attorney put the government's egregious closing arguments indicated that
the arguments did not deny to Darden a fundamentally fair trial. In a
footnote, the Court distinguished in several ways Darden from Caldwell. 79

First, Caldwell involved a claim of prosecutorial misconduct at

the summation of the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial that was
approved by the trial judge. In Darden, the improper comments came at
the conclusion of the guilt phase, and, according to the Court, were
therefore less likely to affect sentencing. Moreover, the Court suggested
75 Darden v. Wainwright, 699 F.2d 1031, 1035 n.5, citing 513 F. Supp. 947, 955, aff'don rehearing en banc, 708 F.2d 646, vacated, 715 F.2d 502, rev'd in part, 725 F.2d 1526, vacated and remanded, - U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 1158, aff'd on other grounds, 767 F.2d 752, cert. granted, - U.S. -,
87 L.Ed.2d 699 (1985).
76 Id. at 1036, n.14.
77 Darden, 54 U.S.L.W. at 4738.
78 Id. at 4738.
79 Id. at n.15.
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that Caldwell is relevant only to closing arguments that minimize the
sentencer's responsibility for the sentencing determination in a misleading way. Hence, the Court concluded Darden's eighth amendment argument to be inapposite.
The case was decided by a five to four split, and Justice Blackmun,
writing for the dissenters, excoriated the majority for abandoning
"heightened reliability." The dissent begins with a stem rebuke, noting
that "[t]oday's opinion ...

reveals a Court willing to tolerate not only

imperfection but a level of fairness and reliability so low it should make
conscientious prosecutors cringe."' 80 The dissent chides the Court for relying on Donnelly but failing to compare the facts, and the egregiousness
of the argument in that case, with the facts in the case sub judice and the
challenged summation therein. The dissent concludes that far from being "ambiguous," as the remarks in Donnelly had been, those in Darden's
trial more closely resembled the improprieties of Berger.
More specifically, the dissent takes issue with the majority's analysis
of the potential for prejudice, denying that the prosecutor's arguments
were "invited response." Next, the dissent disagrees that the curative
instructions of the trial court ameliorated the effect of the improper summation; in fact, Justice Blackmun notes, the trial court overruled the defense objections to the prosecutors' arguments. The dissent also is
incredulous at the Court's suggestion that Darden's counsel used the improper arguments of the government to his advantage-after all, Darden
was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. The dissent
points out in footnote three that the sentencing phase followed immediately after these guilt phase summations, and that there is quite a likelihood that these summations did affect the jury's sentencing decision. For
this reason, the dissent states, the eighth amendment principle of heightened reliability, and not simply a due process analysis, should apply. The
dissent disagrees that the evidence against Darden was so overwhelming
that the likelihood of the arguments' effect on the ultimate outcome was
small.
In its conclusion, the dissent is distressed by the fact that the
Supreme Court has condemned the improper prosecutorial argument
without really taking any action that will have a deterrent effect. Justice
Blackmun writes, "I believe this Court must do more than wring its
hands when a State

. . .

permits prosecutors to pervert the adversary

process." 8 '
Examining the holdings of the United States Supreme Court in these
four very important prosecutorial misconduct at closing argument cases,
80 Id. at 4740 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
81 Id., at 4745 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
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there are several factors which must exist in order to prevail on this kind
of claim in federal court following a state criminal proceeding. First, the
error must be of constitutional dimension. It must be more than an isolated remark, and must so infect the trial as to render it fundamentally
unfair. Second, there must be some showing of prejudice to the defendant. If the case against the defendant is so strong that there is no doubt
that the result would have been the same notwithstanding the improper
argument, the error is harmless. Third, the heightened need for reliability in death penalty cases suggests that what might not reach due process
error under a straight fourteenth amendment analysis could in fact violate the defendant's procedural rights under the eighth amendment's
cruel and unusual punishments clause. It is important to keep these factors in mind when analyzing the standard of the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals in Brooks v. Kemp and its companion cases.
III.

IMPROPER CLOSING ARGUMENT IN CAPITAL CASES IN THE
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit was
congressionally created in 1981 by splitting the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit in two.8 2 The states of Alabama, Florida and Georgia

became the Eleventh Circuit, while Louisiana, Mississippi and Texas
constituted the newly reformed Fifth Circuit.
These two circuits contain nearly half of the death row population
in the United States,83 hence, these circuits hear a large number of
habeas corpus appeals in death penalty cases. The Eleventh Circuit has
understandably taken a leading role in trying to formulate a consistent
eighth amendment jurisprudence with respect to capital punishment, and
attempting to decipher the confusing instructions it has received from the
United States Supreme Court.
As discussed, in 1983 the Eleventh Circuit decided in Hance v. Zant
an important prosecutorial misconduct at closing argument case. The
petitioner, William Henry Hance, had raised as error improper closing
argument at both the guilt and sentencing phases of his trial.
The objectionable argument at the guilt phase included inflam82 28 U.S.C. sec. 41 (1980) (as amended); Bonner v. City of Pritchard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11 th Cir.
1981) (en banc). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit is located in Atlanta, Georgia
and began operation on October 1, 1981.
83 Death Row U.S.A., (June 1, 1986). According to a bimonthly publication of the NAACP
Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., Death Row, U.S.A., the Fifth Circuit states have the
following death row populations-Texas, 221; Louisiana, 47; Mississippi, 46. In the states of the
Eleventh Circuit, Alabama has 82, Georgia, 107, and Florida, 231. The seven hundred-plus inmates
on death row in these six states constitute more than 42% of the inmates sentenced to death in
America.
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matory descriptions of the crime scene and the personal convictions of
the prosecutor as to the credibility of the state's witnesses.8 4 The Eleventh Circuit found these arguments to be improper but, applying a totality of the circumstances test, held that they did not render "the
determination of Hance's guilt fundamentally unfair."'8 5 The factors the
court considered in analyzing the improper argument were:
(1) the degree to which the challenged remarks have a tendency to
mislead the jury and to prejudice the accused; (2) whether they are
isolated or extensive; (3) whether they were deliberate or accidentally placed before the jury; and, except in the sentencing phase of
of the competent proof to
capital murder trials, (4) the strength
86
establish the guilt of the accused.
In so holding, the Court of Appeals placed its primary reliance on
the strength of the prosecution's case as to guilt, concluding that the improper argument did not rise to error of constitutional dimension. It is
important to note that the Court of Appeals did not address the effect of
the guilt phase improprieties on the jury's determination as to the appropriate sentence, as does the dissent in Darden three years later.
The court was less willing to look the other way in regard to the
prosecutor's argument at the close of the sentencing phase. The court
began its discussion by noting that the Georgia statute mandated that
any death sentence be based on the existence of statutory aggravating
circumstances, without the influence of "passion, prejudice, or any other
arbitrary factor."'8 7 Using this as a basis for analysis, the court examined
the objectionable portions of the prosecutor's closing sentencing phase
argument.
The prosecutor first suggested to the jury that the death penalty was
the appropriate sentence in this case because the District Attorney's office otherwise would not have sought it. "I've been with the District
Attorney's office for a little over eight years now and it's my recollection
that we've had no more than a dozen times, no more than twelve times in
those eight years to request [the death penalty] out of the thousands of
cases. . . that pass through our office." 88 The prosecutor then remarked
on the future dangerousness of the defendant even in prison, both because of the possibility of escape and because of his contact with other
inmates and guards. The prosecutor made an extended metaphorical allusion to the jurors as soldiers in a war on crime. He told them that they
84 Hance, 696 F.2d at 951.
85 Id.

86 Id., at 950, n. 7, citing United States v. Leon, 534 F.2d 667, 679 (6th Cir. 1976).
87 See Ga. Code Ann. section 27-2537(c)(1) (1976).
88 Hance, 696 F.2d at 951-952.
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had an opportunity to do something to stem crime. He told them that he
selected each of them for their individual courage. He related their jobs
as jurors to the tasks performed by soldiers of the United States armed
forces.
You know, we've had three wars in this country just in my
lifetime, World War II, war in Korea, war in Vietnam. In each of
those wars we drafted young men, take them out of civilian life,
train them, equip them, sent them to fight for us, young as seventeen, perhaps some as young as sixteen years of age. And, we've
sent them off to some land halfway across the world, and we've
pointed them at some individual that they didn't even know, and
we've said this person is the enemy, they are trying to destroy our
way of life, when you see this person, kill him. And thank God we
did it, don't get me wrong, because those individuals did save our
way of life, they did protect our freedom, they're the reason we're
able to live in this Country today under the system of freedom that
we have. We've asked seventeen year olds to kill to protect our
system, our home and families. Do we ask any less of you in this
situation?89
The Court of Appeals concluded that "[t]he sentencing hearing in this
case was fundamentally unfair and therefore constitutionally intolerable." 90 Surprisingly, the court said little else, apparently believing this
argument to be so wholly inappropriate and prejudicial as to render any
analysis or explanation excess verbiage. The only clue the court gives is
in a very brief footnote that applies three of the four factors listed above,
i.e., "that the prosecutor's inflammatory remarks were deliberate, extensive, and highly prejudicial to the accused." 9'
Hance proved to be a benchmark by which challenged arguments in
other capital cases in the Eleventh Circuit were judged. Hance was originally tried in Columbus, Muscogee County, Georgia and, not surprisingly, a number of other death penalty cases from Muscogee County also
raised as error the prosecutor's closing argument. Both Brooks v. FranCiS 9 2 and Tucker v. Zant 9 3 were Muscogee County cases in which, applying Hance and Donnelly, the three-judge panels of the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed District Court denials of petitions for writs of
habeas corpus and granted relief based on prosecutorial misconduct at
89 Id. at 952.
90 Id. at 953.
91 Id. at n. 12.

92 715 F.2d 780 (1 1th Cir. 1983). The party representing the state in habeas corpus cases often
change as the administration of a prison or Corrections Department changes. This is the case in
both the Brooks case and the Tucker case.
93 724 F.2d 882 (1 lth Cir. 1984).
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closing argument. However, rehearing en banc was granted in both
cases, 94 and on a third capital case decided on, inter alia, prosecutorial
misconduct at closing argument, Drake v. Francis.95
The en banc Court of Appeals reversed the panel decisions in two of
these three cases as far as prosecutorial misconduct at closing argument,
overruling Hance in the process. The new standard for reversal of death
sentences by the federal courts on habeas review was set forth in
Brooks.96 In order for a conviction or sentence of death to be reversed by
means of federal court collateral review of a state proceeding, the objectionable argument must render the trial or sentencing hearing fundamentally unfair based on "a reasonable probability that, in the absence of the
'97
improper arguments, the outcome would have been different."
This standard, applied also in Drake and Tucker, is a marked departure from prior precedent. Its direct origin is the 1984 Supreme Court
decision in Strickland discussed in Part I. Strickland involved a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel raised on collateral review in federal
court. Having suffered reversals by the Supreme Court in both Stephens
and Strickland, Brooks was the Eleventh Circuit's attempt to enforce the
Supreme Court's dictates by applying that Strickland standard for prejudice to habeas corpus cases raising prosecutorial misconduct at closing
argument. A specific review of the objectionable closing argument in
Brooks will be helpful for an understanding of the legal issue and as a
measure by which to judge other challenged closing arguments.
The challenged argument in Brooks took place at the conclusion of
the sentencing phase of the trial. The prosecutor began by discussing
two justifications for punishment-retribution and deterrence. He argued that the only appropriate punishment for Brooks, convicted of the
kidnapping, robbery, rape and murder of a young woman, was death by
electrocution. He then informed the jury of his opinion that the death
penalty was necessary, arguing that the crime rate in Georgia had increased steadily since 1964, the last year that Georgia had, at that time,
executed someone. The prosecutor attributed that increase to the disuse
of the death penalty.
The prosecutor discussed the victim's character and reminded the
jury of the pain experienced, and to be experienced, by the victim's family. He then explained to the jury why the prosecutor's office sought the
death penalty, implying that if death were not the appropriate punish94 Tucker v. Zant, 724 F.2d 898 (11th Cir. 1984); Brooks v. Francis, 728 F.2d 1358 (1 1th Cir.
1984).
95 727 F.2d 990, vacated for reh'g en banc, 727 F.2d 990, 1003 (11th Cir. 1984).
96 762 F.2d 1383 (11th Cir. 1985).
97 Id. at 1400, 1401.
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ment in this case, his office would have not sought it. After stating all his
other reasons, the prosecutor claimed that the defendant was incapable
of rehabilitation. He denigrated the mitigating circumstances that might
be suggested to the jury by the defense, and sought to diminish the jury's
sense of responsibility if it chose to impose the death sentence. He asserted that the police, the judge in the preliminary hearing, the grand
jury that returned the indictment, himself and the staff of the prosecutor's office, the executioner-all would be as responsible as the jury for
the defendant's death sentence. Most of all, claimed the prosecutor, William Brooks would be responsible for his death sentence.
In the next phase of his summation, the prosecutor said Mr. Brooks
himself obviously believed in the death penalty. He then suggested that
the victim was not accorded the rights that the government was affording
Mr. Brooks.
The prosecutor then discussed the defendant's future dangerousness,
suggesting he could kill a prison guard, or escape and kill another citizen.
He argued that there was no reason to spend a lot of money to keep
Brooks in prison, implying they could execute him and avoid needless
cost.
The prosecutor made the "war against crime" speech found objectionable in Hance, and told the jury that Brooks was a cancer that had to
be removed to save the body of society.
Lastly, he reminded the jurors of the promise each had made that
they were not so conscientiously opposed to capital punishment that they
could not consider it in a proper case, and would impose a death sentence
if the facts and circumstances warranted it. The jurors were to infer, of
course, that they would be breaking their promises to return a sentence
98
less than death.

The Court of Appeals restated the prosecutor's closing argument,
then turned to the legal standard appropriate for adjudging a claim of
prosecutorial misconduct at closing argument on federal habeas corpus
review.
Addressing first the "dangers of prosecutorial argument," the court
briefly discussed a prosecutor's duty to do justice. 99 The court then
looked to Donnelly to support its conclusion that the scope of review in
post-conviction collateral attacks is more narrow than appellate review of
federal criminal proceedings. Donnelly, explained the court of appeals,
established "important guideliness" for habeas review of state criminal
proceedings vis i vis allegedly improper closing argument. Among them,
98 Id.

at 1397.

99 Id., at 1399.

1986]

TUCKER v. KEMP

the reviewing court is not to judge the fairness of each challenged remark; rather, the appropriate question is whether the closing argument,
examined in the context of the entire trial, rendered the proceeding fundamentally unfair. The Eleventh Circuit noted that, in the context of
criminal trials, due process is defined in terms of the reliability of the
result. 100 Then, in the last and most controversial prong of its analytical
test, the Court of Appeals looked to the prejudice standard applied by
the United States Supreme Court in Strickland.
Because the Eleventh Circuit was apparently aware of the questionable propriety of the Strickland standard, it defended its use on several
grounds. First, the court noted that the "central concern" of Strickland
was "fundamental fairness," the same concern acknowledged in Brooks.
Second, the court analogized prosecutorial misconduct claims to ineffective assistance of counsel claims, suggesting that in both cases the reviewing court is to look not to individual improprieties, but to the effect of the
aggregation of improprieties on the trial as a whole. The Eleventh Circuit lauded the flexibility of the "reasonable probability" prejudice test
and concluded that it fit well within the parameters of Donnelly.
Before applying this prejudice standard, the Eleventh Circuit discussed generally the scope of permissible prosecutorial argument at the
sentencing phase of a capital murder trial. The court first paid lip service
to the eighth amendment requirement for heightened reliability that
death is the appropriate punishment, acknowledging that eighth amendment jurisprudence requires capital sentencing proceedings to "minimize
the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action." 10
' The court noted
that even in capital sentencing proceedings, however, perfection is not
required. 0 2 Yet the court recognized the teaching of Gardnerv. Florida
that "the decision to impose the death sentence be, and appear to be,
'0 3
based on reason rather than caprice or emotion."'
With these considerations in mind, the Eleventh Circuit then outlined permissible areas for prosecutorial closing argument. First, the
prosecutor may outline his proof that aggravating circumstances exist to
support a sentence of death. Second, he may discuss any information
about the defendant, his character or crime which had been properly
placed before the jury during either phase of the trial. The future dangerousness of the defendant is also a constitutionally permissible area of
argument, as is any "accepted penological justification[s] for the use of
100 Id. at 1400, citing Hobby v. United States, - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 3093, 3096 (1984); Beck v.
Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637-638 (1980); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-173 (1952).
101 Id. at 1404, citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976).
102Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978).
103 Brooks, 762 F.2d at 1404, citing Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1979).
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death as a punishment," notably retribution and deterrence. 10 4
Turning to the specific closing argument in the case, the Eleventh
Circuit outlined twelve specific remarks challenged as objectionable by
Brooks, discussing each in turn. The first challenged remark was the
prosecutor's comments that he believed in the death penalty; this the
court deemed irrelevant. Next the Court addressed the prosecutor's argument that the crime rate had risen steadily since 1964 and the implication that the increase was due to the disuse of the death penalty.
Acknowledging the absence of any evidence in the record concerning
either the crime rate or the relationship between the increase and disuse
of the death penalty, the court concluded that the increase in the crime
rate was "within the common knowledge of all reasonable people,"'' 5
and that the relationship between the disuse of capital punishment and
the increase in crime was in fact an argument about deterrence-a legitimate area for prosecutorial argument. Third, the court examined the
prosecutor's remarks about the character of the victim, and determined
that they were "brief enough that we cannot conclude that they injected
prejudicial or irrelevant material into the sentencing decision."' 10 6 The
court then dismissed the statements about the pain of the victim's family
as "no more than a compelling statement of the victim's death and its
07
significance, relevant to the retributive function of the death penalty."'
The court did find improper the prosecutor's suggestion that the death
penalty was the appropriate punishment because his office so rarely
sought the death penalty, and only in deserving cases. However, the
court characterized the remarks about the jury not being the only step in
the process leading to the defendant's death, and its implication of diminished jury responsibility for the sentencing decision, as nothing more
than an attempt to place on the defendant's own shoulders the responsibility for his predicament. The court similarly concluded that what Mr.
Brooks alleged was an argument denigrating his exercise of his constitutional rights was really an ambiguous argument that the jury did not
understand in the improper way asserted by Brooks. The court found
the prosecutor's argument relating to the possibility that he might kill a
prison guard or, worse, escape and kill another citizen entirely proper to
the consideration of the defendant's future dangerousness. The Court of
Appeals did find the argument that the jury should impose the death
penalty because of its cost effectiveness to be improper, but found the
prosecutor's analogy to the jurors as soldiers in the war on crime to in104 Id. at 1407.

105Id. at 1408, citing Tenorio v. United States, 390 F.2d 96, 99 (1979).
106 Id. at 1409.
107 Id. at 1410.
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clude both proper and improper references. Specifically, the court found
that the remarks analogizing the death penalty to killing in a war proper,
concluding that "death, while difficult, is at times sanctioned by the state
because of compelling reasons." 10 8 Improper portions of the argument
were those which suggested the jury's absence of discretion in fulfilling
its sentencing responsibility. The court also held that discussing the
"criminal element" and then seeking the death penalty against Brooks
for being a part of that element distracted the jury from its appropriate
focus on the individualized characteristics of the defendant and the
crime. The court characterized as dramatic the prosecutor's reference to
"cancer," but determined the reference to be relevant to a finding of the
defendant's future dangerousness. Finally, the court concluded that a
remark challenged by Brooks as a racial slur was, in fact, not one.
Of the twelve separate remarks alleged to be improper, the Eleventh
Circuit found four to be improper: the prosecutor's expressions of personal belief in capital punishment; the discussion of the prosecutor's policy of rarely seeking the death penalty (the "prosecutorial expertise"
argument); the claim that killing Brooks would save taxpayers money;
and, the portion of the "war on crime" speech.' 0 9
Of these four "troubling" arguments, the court concluded that none,
individually or in aggregation, denied the defendant a fundamentally fair
sentencing hearing. This conclusion was based on several factors which
tended to mitigate the adverse impact of these arguments, such as their
brevity, the defense rebuttal, the judge's instructions, and other portions
of the prosecutor's arguments. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of
Appeals held that there was no reasonable probability that the
prosecutorial misconduct changed the outcome.
The allegedly improper argument in Tucker was very similar to the
one complained of in Brooks. The arguments found to be improper by
the Eleventh Circuit were the "prosecutorial expertise" argument (prosecutor informs the jury of how rarely his office seeks the punishment of
death), the prosecutor's expression of personal opinion ("I'd rather move
to Russia before I'd live next door to this man" and "If he's executed, ...
I'll sleep better knowing that one of them won't be on the street."), 10 the
diminution of jury responsibility argument "suggesting that the jury is
only the last link in a long decision"' (differed from a similar argument
in Brooks by its absence to place responsibility on the defendant's own
shoulders), and finally, the cost effectivness argument. As in Brooks, the
Id. at 1412.
at 1413.
11OTucker, 762 F.2d at 1484.
108

109 Id.

I1Id. at 1485.
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Court of Appeals concluded that these remarks, while improper, did not
deny to Mr. Tucker a fundamentally fair sentencing hearing, nor was
there a reasonable probability that absent these improprieties the result
would have been different.
In Drake,"t 2 the allegedly improper argument was slightly different
than those complained of in Brooks and Tucker. First, the prosecutor
read lengthy quotations from opinions of the Georgia Supreme Court
suggesting the impropriety of mercy during sentencing deliberations in
murder cases. The cases from which the prosecutor quoted were over
one hundred years old, a fact not disclosed to Drake's jury. The Eleventh Circuit disapproved of this argument, labelling it worse than the
"prosecutorial expertise" argument held to be improper in Brooks and
Tucker. It was improper both because it led the jurors to conclude that
the Supreme Court of Georgia had already spoken for them on the subject of mercy at the sentencing phase, and because the substance of the
opinions from which the prosecutor had quoted was clearly in conflict
with modern eighth amendment jurisprudence. Pursuant to Georgia's
capital sentencing scheme, the jury had complete discretion to grant
mercy and to sentence a defendant convicted of capital murder to life
imprisonment rather than death.' 1 3 In light of its finding that this argument was clearly improper, the Court of Appeals held that there was a
reasonable probability that but for the improper argument, the result of
the sentencing hearing would have been different. 1 4 The Eleventh Circuit based this conclusion on what it perceived to be a "weak" case at the
guilt phase of the trial. 15
This new standard for reversal of state criminal proceedings in federal post-conviction collateral attacks, based on prosecutorial misconduct at closing argument, was almost immediately called into question as
the appropriate legal standard in such cases. The Brooks, Tucker, and
Drake decisions were handed down by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit on May 31, 1985. Less than two weeks
later, the United States Supreme Court decided Caldwell, holding that
where a prosecutor's argument in the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial diminished the jury's sense of responsibility for its decision to
impose a sentence of death, that argument violated the defendant's
eighth and fourteenth amendment rights to heightened reliability that
death is the appropriate punishment. Both William Tucker and William
Brooks petitioned the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals for rehearing,
112762 F.2d 1449 (1lth Cir. 1985) (en banc).
113 Id. at 1459.
114 Id. at 1461.
115 Id.
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but both petitions were denied. 1 6 However, dissenting from the denial
of these petitions for rehearing, Judge Clark, joined by Judges Kravitch
and Johnson, noted that the standard for prejudice adopted by the court
in Brooks and applied also in Tucker conflicted with the prejudice standard applied by the Supreme Court in Caldwell. The Supreme Court
applied the more traditional harmless error standard of Chapman v. California."t7 "Because we cannot say that this effort [to minimize the jury's
responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the death penalty]
had no effect on the sentencing decision, that decision does not meet the
standard of reliability that the Eighth Amendment requires." '" 8
After failing to convince the Eleventh Circuit to reconsider its decision, William Tucker petitioned for a writ of certiorari from the United
States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted the writ, reversed
the Eleventh Circuit's decision and remanded the case to that court for
further consideration in light of Caldwell.'1 9 The case is still pending at
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, although a
decision should be forthcoming in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Darden.
Neither the "reasonable probability" prejudice standard nor the
Donnelly "fundamental fairness" analysis is appropriate to federal habeas
review of death penalty cases raising prosecutorial misconduct at closing
argument, for several reasons.
The Donnelly "fundamental fairness" analysis is misplaced because,
where the death penalty is involved, eighth amendment as well as fourteenth amendment implications are involved in alleged prosecutorial misconduct. At the outset of its analysis in Brooks, the Eleventh Circuit
recognized that in capital cases there is a heightened "need for reliability
in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case," the "death is different" doctrine. Yet in discussing the propriety of the Donnelly "fundamental fairness" analysis, the Court of
Appeals sought to define that standard in terms of the reliability of the
judicial process. This suggests a confusion between fourteenth amendment reliability-that sufficient to maintain the integrity of the judicial
process-and eighth amendment heightened reliability-reliability con116 Brooks v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1383, 1448 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (en banc); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d
1480, 1496 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (en banc). These petitions for rehearing were denied on July 23, 1985,
approximately six weeks after the U.S. Supreme Court decided Caldwell.
117 386 U.S. 18 (1967). In Chapman, the U.S. Supreme Court held that in order for federal
constitutional error to be harmless, the burden is on the state to show its harmlessness beyond a
reasonable doubt.
118 Brooks v. Kemp, 762 F.2d at 1448, citing Caldwell v. Mississippi, 105 S.Ct. at 2646. (Clark,
J.dissenting) (emphasis added).
119 Tucker v. Kemp, - U.S. -, 88 L.Ed.2d 452 (1985).

ANTIOCH LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 4:181

comitant with the difference, not in degree but in kind, between death
and any other punishment. As noted above, the doctrine of "heightened
reliability" has never been strictly defined, but there is no doubt that it
must be something more than the straight due process analysis of Donnelly. The Supreme Court made this distinction clear, if not through
Caldwell itself, then surely through its reversal and remand of Tucker for
further consideration in light of Caldwell.
The more serious error is the Eleventh Circuit's application of
Strickland's "reasonable probability" prejudice standard. As discussed,
it is completely incompatible with the standard "harmless error" test of
Chapman applied by the Supreme Court to prosecutorial misconduct at
closing argument in Caldwell. More importantly, the Supreme Court addressed prosecutorial misconduct at closing argument in Darden. It applied the "fundamental fairness" standard of Donnelly without discussing
the Eleventh Circuit's Brooks permutations. There is an argument to be
made that no federal court need reach the prejudice problem using the
Donnelly approach as applied in Darden, because even highly improper
prosecutorial summations do not rise to error of constitutional dimension
if they do not so infect the trial as a whole as to deny the defendant
fundamental fairness. This argument is facile sophistry, and avoids the.
problem of eighth amendment violation implicit in summation errors
during the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial.
Even in the absence of specific conflict with Supreme Court precedent, the application of the "reasonable probability" test to prosecutorial
misconduct at closing argument is seriously flawed. In explaining why
certain types of sixth amendment right to counsel claims are accorded a
presumption of prejudice, the Supreme Court in Strickland wrote that
such errors are easy for the government to prevent because the prosecution is directly responsible. In addition, among the reasons for requiring
actual prejudice in ineffective assistance of counsel claims is "[t]he government is not responsible for, and hence not able to prevent, attorney
errors that will result in reversal of a conviction or sentence.' 1 20
Unlike a defense lawyer, who is solely an advocate in an adversarial
process, the prosecutor is at once both an advocate for one party to a
controversy and a government official "whose interest, therefore, in a
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall
be done."' 121 A defendant is certainly more able to shoulder the burdens
of proof and going forward in an ineffectiveness claim, where the tools of
effective assistance are discoverable, than in a prosecutorial misconduct
at closing argument case. Particularly in death penalty cases, the subtle
120
121

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 2067.
Berger, 235 U.S. at 88.
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decisionmaking process in a sentencing proceeding is easily influenced by
inappropriate references because the task itself is so emotion-laden. This
being so, the burden should be on the government to show that an admittedly improper argument had no effect. Lastly, as so eloquently stated in
dissent in Brooks, it is unreasonable that the greater the strength of the
government's case, the more egregious its suinmation may be without
being reversible.' 22 Because the state performs a didactic function by
fostering societal ethics, and particularly because the judiciary is the
most important performer in that role, even the "harmless error" test of
Chapman may be inappropriate where an argument so exceeds the
bounds of propriety and fairness that the state ought simply not to sanction it in any way.
IV.

THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD

The standard for reversal in federal post-conviction collateral attacks of convictions or sentences based on prosecutorial misconduct in
state death penalty cases should be very similar to that applied in Hiance
v. Zant.123 The test in Hiance was a totality of the circumstances test. In
evaluating the challenged argument, the Court of Appeals suggested for
consideration a number of factors, including: (1) the degree to which the
remarks tended to mislead the jury and prejudice the accused; (2) the
extent of the improper remarks; (3) the motivation of the prosecutor in
making the improper remarks; and, except in the sentencing phase of a
capital murder trial, (4) the strength of the government's case.
In addition, in death penalty cases the reviewing court should specifically consider the degree to which the challenged remark tended to degrade the inherent dignity of the defendant as a human being, for an
24
argument which does so is intolerable to eighth amendment principles.
In addition, in capital cases the reviewing courts should consider the degree to which the challenged argument tended to inject into the proceedings the element of passion. The Eleventh Circuit noted in Brooks that
"the fact that an argument by defense counsel or prosecutor has emotional overtones does not independently indict it as improper."'125 While
this is true, it is incorrect to then conclude that "[t]he propriety of argument rests primarily in the relation of its content to issues relevant to the
sentencing jury's concern."1 26 It is likely that, absent meaningful reBrooks, 762 at 1424 (Johnson, J. dissenting); 762 F.2d at 1431 (Clark, J. dissenting).
Hance, 696 F.2d 940, 950 n.7 (11th Cir. 1983).
124 See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 270-271
122
123

(Brennan, J. dissenting).
125 Brooks, 762 F.2d at 1405.
126 Ibid.

ANTIOCH LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 4:181

straints, given the implicitly emotional nature of the crimes at issue and
the potential punishment for the crime, prosecutors will deliver arguments directed to relevant sentencing considerations in such an excessive
manner that any resultant sentence of death will not "be, and appear to
be, based on reason rather than caprice or emotion."'' 27 This was at least
part of the concern expressed by the dissent in the Supreme Court in
Darden.1

28

Finally, this standard must be equally applicable to both guilt phase
and sentencing phase arguments of capital murder trials. Using the
Chapman harmless error test, the government may be able to show that
an improper argument at the conclusion of the guilt phase did not affect
the jury's sentencing decision. It is absolutely ridiculous to assume, however, that the jury is not affected at sentencing by an improper guilt phase
summation. The challenged argument in Darden is a case in point. The
summation at the guilt phase included extensive references to the defendant as an "animal" and the prosecutor's wishes that the defendant were
already dead. 129 This type of argument should be presumed to have an
effect on the jury at sentencing. In cases where there is some delay between the guilt and sentencing phases of the trial, the courts should consider the mitigating effect of the delay between the improper guilt phase
argument and the sentencing decision. Other factors might also be relevant in evaluating these claims. The underlying test is the effect of the
argument based on a totality of the circumstances.
V.

CONCLUSION

The overarching concern of the federal courts adjudging habeas
corpus claims of prosecutorial misconduct at closing argument in state
death penalty cases must be the eighth amendment's heightened need for
reliability that death is the appropriate punishment. Society's standards
of decency, a benchmark for eighth amendment principles, deserve no
less.
The Eleventh Circuit's Brooks standard for prejudice, "reasonable
probability that the result would have been different," is untenable. It
was the product of frustration engendered by the lack of direction provided by the United States Supreme Court in eighth amendment jurisprudence involving capital punishment. In recent years, the Supreme Court
has been trapped in its own ambivalance, entrapping with it the federal
courts and state courts which look to it for direction. The Supreme
Court must reassert leadership in the area of capital punishment or live
127 Gardner, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977).
128

129
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with the consequences of state death chambers that kill, at an ever more
increasing rate, those selected, arbitrarily and capriciously, to die. The
tenor of the Court, however, does not provide confidence that such leadership will be forthcoming. As discussed, Darden was decided by a slim
five-member majority of the Court. In the absence of such leadership,
the federal courts of appeals that decide capital punishment cases face
like Odysseus, Skylla on one side and Charydbis on the other. The Eleventh Circuit has already fallen victim to those treacherous demons in
recent years. Rather than tacking from one side of the narrow strait to
the other, and hitting both, the courts must hold a steady course with the
doctrine of "heightened reliability."

